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The Evidential Significance of Thought 
Experiment in Science 
James W. McAllister * 
The most promising way to regard thought experiment is as a species of 
experiment, alongside concrete experiment. Of the authors who take this view, 
many portray thought experiment as possessing evidential significance intrinsi- 
cally. In contrast, concrete experiment is nowadays most convincingly portrayed 
as acquiring evidential significance in a particular area of science at a particular 
time in consequence of the persuasive efforts of scientists. I argue that the claim 
that thought experiment possesses evidential significance intrinsically is contra- 
dicted by the history of science. Thought experiment, like concrete experiment, 
has evidential significance only where particular assumptions-such as the 
Galilean doctrine of phenomena-are taken to hold; under alternative premises, 
in themselves equally defensible, thought experiment is evidentially inert. Copy- 
right 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd. 
1. The Experimentalist View of Thought Experiment 
It frequently occurs in science that a claim is established or discredited by a 
thought experiment. Since they appear to be no more than short fictional 
narratives, how do thought experiments come to have this power? 
One answer is offered by what I shall call the ‘experimentalist view’ that 
thought experiments are experiments, albeit an extreme form of them. l On this 
view, a thought experiment, like a concrete experiment, provides evidence 
about the world; and a thought experiment establishes or discredits a scientific 
claim in the way a concrete experiment does, in the light of the evidence about 
the world that it provides. This view has lately been endorsed by Roy A. 
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‘Among alternatives to the experimentalist view are the view that a thought experiment is a 
reconceptualization of old empirical data, advanced by T. S. Kuhn, ‘A Function for Thought 
Experiments’ (1964), in T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition 
and Change (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 24c265; the view that it is an 
argument of a particular sort, advanced by J. Norton, ‘Thought Experiments in Einstein’s Work’, 
in T. Horowitz and G. J. Massey (eds), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy (Savage, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991), pp. 129-148; and the view that it is the manipulation of a 
mental model, advanced by N. MiSEeviC, ‘Mental Models and Thought Experiments’, International 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (1992), 215-226. 
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Sorensen and, in some respects, by James R. Brown.2 I share the belief that the 
experimentalist view offers the best prospect of making sense of thought 
experiment, though I regard it as having implications that Brown and Sorensen 
would not accept, as will become clear. 
Since the experimentalist view assimilates thought experiment to concrete 
experiment, one might expect experimentalist accounts of thought experiment 
to parallel the most persuasive available accounts of concrete experiment. In 
fact, the accounts of thought experiment offered by Brown and Sorensen, as 
well as those of other supporters of the experimentalist view, diverge from the 
most persuasive present-day accounts of concrete experiment. The divergence 
occurs where the discussion turns to the evidential significance of thought 
experiment. Brown and Sorensen hold to a logicist notion of evidential 
significance, according to which evidential significance is an intrinsic property 
of thought experiment. In contrast, the most convincing accounts of concrete 
experiments available today hold to a historicist notion of evidential signifi- 
cance, according to which the evidential significance of concrete experiment is 
the outcome of historical and local accomplishments. 
The present paper examines this divergence between accounts of thought and 
concrete experiment. I will suggest that the logicist notion of evidential 
significance is no more tenable for thought experiment than it is for concrete 
experiment, and will argue that our understanding of thought experiment is 
advanced if we adopt for thought experiment the historicist view of evidential 
significance that has been developed for concrete experiment. This paper will 
not offer a taxonomy of thought experiments. It is likely that a full account of 
thought experiment requires such a taxonomy: thought experiments, like 
concrete experiments, can take various forms and serve various purposes.3 
But, whatever forms and purposes it has, thought experiment must possess 
evidential significance in order to play a role in science; and it is with the nature 
of evidential significance that this paper is concerned. 
2. Logicist and Historicist Accounts of Evidential Significance 
If a particular concrete experiment is to be accepted in a science as a source 
of evidence, the practitioners of that science must be persuaded of its legitimacy 
*R. A. Sorensen, Thought Experiments (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), and ‘Thought 
Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992) lw, 
J. R. Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences (London: 
Routledge, 1991), and ‘Why Empiricism Won’t Work’, in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik 
(eds), PSA 1992: Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 
2 vols (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 271-279. 
‘Taxonomies of thought experiment are offered by Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., 
note 2, pp. 33-48, and Norton, op. cit., note 1, p. 131. The claim that concrete experiments have 
various forms and purposes is substantiated for example by I. Hacking, Representing and 
Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), pp. 1499275. 
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on two counts. Most obviously, they must be persuaded that the particular 
experiment satisfies the standards of competence in experimental practice 
holding within that science. These standards may prescribe that an experiment 
should be suitably controlled for extraneous factors, that any instruments used 
in its performance should be properly calibrated, and so on. But more 
fundamentally, the practitioners must be persuaded that experiment at all yields 
evidence relevant to resolving controversies in the science. Unless they regard 
appealing to experiment as relevant to the resolution of controversies, there will 
be no point for them to debate whether a particular experiment has been 
conducted competently. I express the fact that, in a given science, experiment 
counts as a source of evidence relevant to establishing and discrediting claims 
by saying that, in that science, experiment has evidential significance. 
Let us consider how our view of the evidential significance of concrete 
experiment has recently evolved. Until some time ago, discussion of concrete 
experiment was conducted on what I shall call the ‘logicist premise’ that the 
evidential significance of experiment is intrinsic to it, and not dependent on 
argumentative context. If this premise held, it would be self-evidently justified 
to resolve scientific controversies by experiment: it would follow from an 
intrinsic property of experiment-namely, its evidential significance-that it is 
valid to appeal to experiment to establish and discredit scientific claims. 
The logicist premise invokes a distinction between the evidential significance 
of experiment and the evidential significance of a particular experiment for a 
particular scientific claim. Whether a given experiment is relevant to establish- 
ing and discrediting a given claim-in other words, whether a given experiment 
has evidential significance for a given claim-depends in part on background 
assumptions. For example, whether Robert A. Millikan’s oil drop experiments 
have evidential significance for the claim that the electron has a particular 
charge depends on assumptions about electrons, oil drops, and Millikan’s 
apparatus. Because of this, the evidential significance of a given experiment for 
a given claim is not intrinsic to the experiment: it may occur that an experiment 
has evidential significance for a given claim on some assumptions but not on 
others. This is acknowledged widely in present-day philosophy of science, 
including by those whom I cite as holding to the logicist premise. But our topic 
here is not the evidential significance of a particular experiment for a particular 
claim: it is the evidential significance of the practice of experiment. The logicist 
premise asserts that whether experiment, in this latter sense, has evidential 
significance does not depend on any assumptions: there are no special factors 
that can annul the relevance of experiment to establishing and discrediting 
scientific claims. 
The distinction between the evidential significance of experiment and the 
evidential significance of a particular experiment for a particular claim is 
emphasized by the following observation. It is possible to discover that a 
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particular experiment lacks evidential significance for a particular claim-for 
example, that Millikan’s experiment has no bearing on the claim that the 
electron has a particular mass. But such a discovery does not undermine the 
belief that experiment has evidential significance: anyone holding such a belief 
would remain convinced that scientific claims are established and discredited by 
experiment, and would simply search for an alternative experiment that has 
evidential significance for the given claim. 
Among those who have given logicist accounts of concrete experiment is Karl 
R. Popper.4 On Popper’s view, the evidential significance of experiment is 
conferred by the fact that experiment is the source of observation statements 
which refute possible theories. The evidential significance of experiment thus 
derives entirely from the logical relation between observation statements and 
the claims of possible theories: it is affected neither by argumentative context 
nor by any other factor. It follows from this that the validity of appealing 
to experiment to discredit and establish scientific claims is self-evident. Accord- 
ingly, Popper expects that no scientist who is sufficiently well informed and 
fair minded will resist testing theories by experiment. Of course, Popper 
acknowledges that whether a particular experiment is relevant to testing a 
particular claim depends on background assumptions. 
In recent years, the logicist premise has come increasingly to be regarded as 
an inadequate foundation for the understanding of concrete experiment. The 
principal reason is this: while the logicist premise deems evidential significance 
to be intrinsic to experiment, the historical record suggests strongly that it is the 
outcome of historical and local accomplishments. More precisely, the historical 
record suggests that the evidential significance of experiment is not an intrinsic 
property of the practice, but rather is conferred on experiment at particular 
times in particular areas of science by the persuasive effort of scientists. Without 
this effort having been expended in a particular science, experiment in that 
science is evidentially inert. It follows from this that the validity of appealing to 
experiment in establishing and discrediting scientific claims can never properly 
be considered self-evident: if effort was required to establish the evidential 
significance of experiment, it must be that the justification of appealing to 
experiment was once disputed, and it cannot be ruled out that some day it will 
again be. 
In this light, the logicist premise has two shortcomings as a foundation for an 
understanding of experiment. Firstly, and most directly, by treating the 
evidential significance of experiment as an intrinsic property of it, the logicist 
premise conflicts with the finding that it is the outcome of historical and local 
accomplishments. Secondly, the logicist premise precludes our understanding 
4K. R. Popper, The Logic of ScientiJic Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959; tenth impression, 
revised, 1980), pp. lObll1. Popper puts forward a logicist account of thought experiment, ibid., 
pp. 442456. 
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the states of affairs that obtain in sciences where and when experiment is not 
attributed evidential significance. For instance, the logicist premise makes 
it impossible to comprehend the stages in which experiment comes to be 
attributed evidential significance in a science, and to make sense of the 
reasoning of scientists who oppose this attribution. On the logicist premise, the 
latter are merely insufficiently aware of the intrinsic evidential significance of 
experiment. 
Largely on the strength of these considerations, the logicist premise has been 
generally replaced in studies of concrete experiment by what I shall call the 
‘historicist premise’, that the evidential significance of experiment is conferred 
on it in particular areas of science at particular times by the persuasive effort of 
scientists.5 
On the historicist premise, the concept of evidential significance escapes the 
descriptive/normative dichotomy that is imposed on it by the logicist premise. 
The logicist premise envisages that the statement ‘Entity E has evidential 
significance in science S may be given a descriptive or a normative interpreta- 
tion. On the descriptive interpretation, the statement asserts that practitioners 
of S believe E to provide evidence relevant to establishing and discrediting 
claims in S. On this interpretation, the statement leaves open the possibility that 
this belief is mistaken, and that E in fact fails to provide such evidence. 
Logicists would apply a descriptive interpretation to, for example, the state- 
ment that observations of the positions of celestial bodies have evidential 
significance in astrology: they would understand this statement as asserting that 
astrologers erroneously believe such observations to provide evidence relevant 
to establishing and discrediting claims about human affairs. On the normative 
interpretation, the statement ‘Entity E has evidential significance in science S 
asserts that E truly provides evidence relevant to establishing and discrediting 
claims in S. Logicists would apply this interpretation to, for example, the 
statement that X-ray diffraction experiments have evidential significance in 
crystallography: they would read this statement as asserting that we ought to 
evaluate claims in crystallography by appeal to such experiments. In contrast, 
on the historicist premise, the statement ‘Entity E has evidential significance in 
science s’ asserts that practitioners of S stipulate that E provides evidence 
relevant to establishing and discrediting claims in S. On this interpretation, 
since the possession of evidential significance by E is the outcome of a 
stipulation, the statement does not allow the possibility that E as a matter of 
fact fails to provide evidence in the science-though of course it allows that 
practitioners of a different science may instead attribute evidential significance 
to entities other than E. 
5What I call the ‘historicist premise’ for concrete experiment is set out for example by S. Shapin 
and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental LIP (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 3-21. 
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3. The Dispute over Forms of Evidence in Early Modem Mechanics 
Our choice between the logicist and the historicist premise in the discussion 
of concrete experiment affects particularly strongly our understanding of early 
modern mechanics. Logicist treatments presume that concrete experiment has 
intrinsic evidential significance in mechanics as in all other sciences, and that it 
is thus self-evident that concrete experiment is a source of knowledge about the 
motion of bodies. But a more careful examination of the historical record shows 
that concrete experiment acquired evidential significance in mechanics at a 
particular time and in particular circumstances, as the outcome of efforts of 
Galileo Galilei and others.6 
In its Aristotelian form, mechanics was conceived primarily as a project to 
account for occurrences in natural circumstances, which I shall call ‘natural 
occurrences’. This conception of the discipline shaped both the form of the 
claims admitted within it, and the entities regarded as apt to establish and 
discredit these claims. Theories in Aristotelian mechanics strove to account for 
the particularities of natural occurrences: for example, the Aristotelian theory 
of free fall attempted to explain the variety of the attributes of natural falls, by 
appeal to factors such as the substance, shape, and weight of individual falling 
bodies. Correspondingly, evidential significance in Aristotelian mechanics was 
vested in reports of natural occurrences, intended to record happenings with as 
little idealization and loss of detail as possible. For example, evidence about 
free fall was constituted by reports of natural falls that strove to record the 
myriad particular attributes of each. Aristotelian theories in many areas of 
mechanics, including the Aristotelian account of free fall, were quite well 
supported by the evidence constituted by natural occurrences. 
Concern for natural occurrences was not shared universally, either in 
antiquity or in the Renaissance. In an alternative approach to the natural 
world, which may be retraced to Pythagoras and Plato, natural occurrences 
were of much less import than a reality conjectured to lie behind them. The 
16th-century natural philosophers who depicted the world as embodying 
proportions and ratios, such as Simon Stevin, viewed mechanics primarily as a 
study of invariant forms underlying, and often not immediately apparent in, 
natural occurrences. 
This approach to the natural world was formalized by Galileo, who came to 
conceive of mechanics as a project to identify and describe phenomena, 
60ther episodes in and aspects of concrete experiment’s acquisition of evidential significance in 
physical science in the seventeenth century are studied by Shapin and Schaffer, op. cit., note 5; 
S. Schaffer, ‘Glass Works: Newton’s Prisms and the Uses of Experiment’, in D. Gooding, T. Pinch 
and S. Schaffer (eds), The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 67-104; and P. Dear, ‘Narratives, Anecdotes, and 
Experiments: Turning Experience intd_Science in the Seventeenth Century’, in P. Dear (ed.), 
The Literary Structure of Scien@c Argument: Historical Studies (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1991), pp. 135-163. 
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fundamental modes in which physical reality manifests itself. On his account, 
each natural occurrence is the resultant of one or more phenomena and a great 
number of accidents. Two natural occurrences can be recognized as occurrences 
of the same sort-for example, as two instances of free fall-in virtue of the fact 
that the same phenomenon-the phenomenon ‘free fall’-partly determines 
them both; but they differ from one another in virtue of the distinct accidents- 
ensuing from properties of the individual falling bodies and of the media in 
which they fall-by which they are determined for the remainder. Although 
accidents are thus responsible for the great variety of natural occurrences, only 
phenomena lie within the scope of theorizing in Galilean mechanics.7 
The Galilean conception of mechanics prescribes both the form of the claims 
that the discipline admits and the entities deemed relevant to assessing them. 
Since phenomena are taken to be much simpler and much less numerous than 
natural occurrences, theories about them will be concise and often mathemati- 
cal, and there will be a relatively small number of them: such theories came 
eventually to be known as ‘laws of nature’. Correspondingly, it follows from the 
relation in which phenomena stand to natural occurrences that reports of 
natural occurrences are of little significance in establishing and discrediting 
theories in Galilean mechanics. It is not that reports of natural occurrences are 
insufficiently exhaustive: on the contrary, they are excessively inclusive, since 
among the attributes that they record are many that derive from accidents 
rather than from phenomena. On these grounds, Galileo proposed that 
evidential significance in mechanics be withdrawn from natural occurrences, 
and vested in entities that, he believed, were better indicators of phenomena. 
One of these entities was what Galileo called ‘experiment’. While in Aristotelian 
terminology experimentum was a witnessed natural occurrence, experiment in 
Galileo’s usage is a contrived occurrence determined in its entirety by a 
phenomenon and to no extent by accidents. Because experiments display 
phenomena in accident-free form, they provide a direct test of theories in 
Galilean mechanics.8 
Those who conceived of mechanics as a science of natural occurrences 
disputed Galileo’s attribution of evidential significance to experiment: they 
believed-with considerable justification-that many experiments were too 
heavily contrived to yield knowledge about the object of their interest, natural 
‘N. Koertge, ‘Galileo and the Problem of Accidents’, Journal of the History of Ideas 38 (1977), 
389408: E. McMullin. ‘Galilean Idealization’. Studies in Historv and Philosoohv of Science 16 
(1985), 247-273. 
. , - 
‘Changes in the meaning of ‘experiment’ in the late sixteenth century are discussed by C. B. 
Schmitt, ‘Experience and Experiment: A Comparison of Zabarella’s View with Galileo’s in De 
motu’, Studies in the Renaissance 16 (1969), 8&138. Previous studies of concrete experiment in 
Galileo include M. Segre, ‘The Role of Experiment in Galileo’s Physics’, Archive for History of 
Exact Sciences 23 (1980), 227-252, and R. H. Naylor, ‘Galileo’s Experimental Discourse’, in 
Gooding, Pinch and Schaffer, op. cit., note 6, pp. 117-134, where also further references may be 
found. 
240 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
occurrences. Between the proponents of mechanics in its Aristotelian and 
Galilean versions there thus opened a dispute about the forms of evidence that 
were to be admitted in the discipline. This dispute is very well illustrated in the 
Fourth Day of Galileo’s Discorsi, where Salviati responds to Simplicio’s 
concern for what actually happens in particular circumstances by arguing that 
natural occurrences yield little information about phenomena.9 
Accounts of the evidential significance of concrete experiment that adhere to 
the logicist premise seriously misrepresent this dispute. On the assumption that 
experiment possesses evidential significance intrinsically, such accounts would 
portray Galileo as unveiling a property of experiment that his opponents 
refused to recognize. But it is clearly open to the practitioners of mechanics to 
choose whether it should be a science of phenomena, as Galileo advocated, or 
of natural occurrences, as his opponents intended. Therefore, neither natural 
occurrences nor experiments either have or lack evidential significance in 
mechanics intrinsically: rather, evidential significance is attributed to natural 
occurrences in the Aristotelian form of mechanics, and to experiments in the 
Galilean form. Only if the discussion of concrete experiment is conducted on 
the historicist premise can we do justice to the dispute between the proponents 
of these different forms of mechanics. 
4. The Aristotelian Rejection of Thought Experiment 
We now turn to the evidential significance of thought experiment. For a 
particular thought experiment to be accepted in a science as a source of 
evidence, two conditions must be satisfied, paralleling the conditions discussed 
earlier for the acceptance of a concrete experiment. Firstly, the practitioners 
must be persuaded that the thought experiment is well formulated on the 
standards holding in that science; these standards may for instance require the 
scenarios envisaged in thought experiments not to violate pertinent established 
laws of nature.10 But more fundamentally, the practitioners must be persuaded 
that thought experimentation at all provides evidence relevant to establishing 
and discrediting claims in the science, i.e. that thought experiment has 
evidential significance there. An account of thought experiments that aspires to 
completeness must therefore explain how thought experiment comes to have 
evidential significance. 
Recent discussions of this issue--even by those authors who have adopted 
the ‘experimentalist view’ that thought experiment is a species of experiment- 
have been conducted for the most part on the logicist premise that the evidential 
significance of thought experiment is intrinsic to it. The logicist premise for 
9G. Galilei, Two New Sciences (1638), translated by S. Drake (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1974), pp. 223-227. 
‘@fhis requirement is stipulated for example by K. V. Wilkes, Real People: Personal Identity 
Without Thought Experiments (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 15-21. 
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thought experiment, like that for concrete experiment, invokes the distinction 
between the evidential significance of a particular experiment for a particular 
claim and the evidential significance of experiment as a practice. Whether a 
given thought experiment has evidential significance for a given claim depends 
in part on background assumptions. Because of this, the evidential significance 
of a given thought experiment for a given claim is not intrinsic to the exper- 
iment: it may occur that a thought experiment has evidential significance for a 
given claim on some assumptions but not on others. This is acknowledged by 
those whom I cite as holding to the logicist premise for thought experiment. But 
our topic here is not the evidential significance of a particular thought exper- 
iment for a particular claim: it is the evidential significance of thought 
experiment as a practice. The logicist premise asserts that whether thought 
experiment, in this latter sense, has evidential significance does not depend on 
any assumptions: there are no special factors that can annul the relevance of 
thought experiment to establishing and discrediting scientific claims. 
Among those who give logicist accounts of thought experiment are Brown 
and Sorensen. Brown commits himself to the view that the evidential signifi- 
cance of thought experiment is intrinsic to it when he claims that thought 
experiment yields a priori knowledge of the world: thought experiment would 
be unable to yield such knowledge if its evidential significance depended on 
circumstances.11 Sorensen believes that a thought experiment that fulfils its 
goal is one which refutes a scientific claim by disproving modal consequences 
of it.12 Thus, in a manner reminiscent of Popper’s treatment of concrete 
experiment, Sorensen retraces the evidential significance of a thought exper- 
iment to the logical relation between its conclusion and the claims of possible 
theories. Since logical relations between statements are supposed to be 
unaffected by circumstances of any kind, Sorensen too acquires a commitment 
to the view that, whatever evidential significance a thought experiment has, it 
has intrinsically. 
Their logicism about the evidential significance of thought experiment leads 
Brown and Sorensen to three conclusions. Firstly, they conclude that there is a 
number of exemplary thought experiments, to which scientists through the 
centuries have added, that have an intrinsic high efficacy in establish- 
ing scientific matters of fact. Secondly, they conclude that scientists of all 
disciplines and epochs who are sufficiently well informed and fair minded will 
acknowledge the evidential significance of these thought experiments. Thirdly, 
they conclude that there is no such event as a process in which thought 
experiment acquires or loses evidential significance in a science. Of course, 
Brown and Sorensen can and do allow that the evidential significance of 
a thought experiment may come only gradually to be acknowledged or 
“Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 7698. 
‘%orensen, Thought Experiments, op. cit., note 2, pp. 132-166. 
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appreciated, but they are committed to the view that thought experiments 
always possess the evidential significance that comes to be recognized in them. 
In contrast, I advocate a historicist account of the evidential significance of 
thought experiment. My account claims that thought experiment, like concrete 
experiment, is conferred evidential significance at particular times in particular 
areas of science by the persuasive effort of scientistsi 
Let us test the logicist and the historicist accounts of thought experiment 
for their ability to make sense of developments in early modern mechanics. 
As has often been remarked, thought experiment attained prominence in 
mechanics with the work of Galileo .I4 Brown and Sorensen devote particular 
attention to a thought experiment that Galileo portrayed as discrediting 
Aristotle’s theory of free fall and establishing his own theory? Aristotle had 
claimed that the rate of fall of bodies depends partly on their weight, and 
that, in general, heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones; in contrast, 
Galileo claimed that rate of fall is independent of weight. Galileo asks us to 
imagine dropping a compound body consisting of a cannonball joined to a 
musket ball. On one reading, he says, Aristotle’s theory implies that the 
compound body falls more slowly than the cannonball alone would, since the 
musket ball retards the cannonball to some extent. On another reading, 
however, Aristotle’s theory implies that the compound body falls faster than 
the cannonball alone would, since the compound body is heavier than the 
cannonball. Galileo concludes that Aristotle’s theory of free fall is inconsist- 
ent. To avoid this inconsistency, a theory of free fall must entail that the 
compound body falls at the same rate as the cannonball alone would; and in 
order to entail this, the theory must claim that the rate of fall of bodies is 
independent of their weight. 16 
How does this thought experiment come to have evidential significance in 
the discussion of free fall? Holding to the logicist premise, Brown and 
Sorensen believe that, whatever evidential significance this thought experiment 
has, it has intrinsically. They view it as self-evidently establishing that the rate 
of fall of bodies is independent of their weight, and imply that they think that 
13An experimentalist view of thought experiment that is compatible with the historicist premise 
is put forward by D. Gooding, ‘What is Experimental About Thought Experiments?, in Hull, 
Forbes and Okruhlik, op. cit., note 2, vol. 2, pp. 28&290; see also D. Gooding, ‘Imaginary Science’, 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1994), 1029-1045. 
“Previous discussions of thought experiment in Galileo include L. Geymonat and A. Carugo, 
‘I cosiddetti “esperimenti mental?’ nei Discorsi galileiani e i loro legami con la tecnica’ (1960), in 
L. Geymonat, Per Galileo: attualitci de1 razionalismo, edited by M. Quaranta (Verona: Bertani, 
1981), pp. 7998; A. Koyre, ‘Galileo’s Treatise De motu gravium: The Use and Abuse of Imaginary 
Experiment’ (1960), in A. Koyre, Metaphysics and Measurement: Essays in Scientific Revolution 
(London: Chapman & Hall, 1968), pp. 44-88; and Naylor, op. cit., note 8, pp. 124127. 
“Galilei, Two New Sciences, op. cit., note 9, pp. 66-72. 
16For further discussion of Aristotle’s account of free fall and Galileo’s interpretation of it, see 
B. M. Caspcr, ‘Galileo and the Fall of Aristotle: A Case of Historical Injustice?‘, American Journal 
of Physics 45 (1977), 325-330. 
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anyone who understood the thought experiment would be compelled to reject 
Aristotle’s theory of free fall for that of Galileo.” 
This view misrepresents the nature and understates the depth of the 
disagreement between the proponents of the Galilean and Aristotelian forms of 
mechanics. Galilean mechanics is a science of phenomena, in which contrived 
occurrences can serve as evidence; Aristotelian mechanics is a science of natural 
occurrences, in which evidence is vested in reports of natural occurrences. 
Thought experiments appeared to the practitioners of Aristotelian mechanics as 
very dissimilar from and not reducible to reports of natural occurrences. On 
these grounds, they regarded thought experiment as having no relevance to 
establishing and discrediting claims in mechanics.18 
The decision of Aristotelian natural philosophers to vest evidential significance 
in reports of natural occurrences and to withhold it from thought experiment is 
apparent in their reactions to the thought experiments that Galileo used against 
them. In a few instances, Aristotelian natural philosophers argued that Galileo’s 
thought experiments admitted conclusions different from those that he drew: this 
response effectively concedes the dispute to Galileo, since it grants thought 
experiments relevance in establishing and discrediting claims in mechanics. For 
the most part, however, Aristotelian natural philosophers countered Galileo’s 
thought experiments with reports of actual occurrences. Against his thought 
experiment about free fall, for example, they cited observations of actual falls of 
bodies of different weights, in which the heavier body reached the ground before 
the lighter body.19 In the attempt to establish that we should not expect the earth’s 
motion to have a detectable effect on the motion of objects around us, Galileo 
presented a thought experiment in which an object dropped from the mast of a 
moving ship falls precisely at the mast’s foot: Aristotelian natural philosophers 
retorted with testimony that, in some actual occurrences of stones dropped from 
ships’ masts, the stones had fallen not onto the deck at all, but overboard.20 Such 
“Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. l-3 and 11-79; Sorensen, Thought 
Experiments, op. cit., note 2, pp. 126127; Sorensen, ‘Thought Experiments and the Epistemology 
of Laws’, op. cit., note 2, pp. 17-18. 
“P Ring ‘Mediaeval Thought-Experiments: The Metamethodology of Mediaeval Science’, in , 
Horowitz and Massey, op. cit., note 1, pp. 43-64, suggests that thought experiment was used in 
medieval natural philosophy; as he concedes, however, his examples can be regarded equally validly 
as instances of reasoning from hypothesis and analogy familiar to Aristotelian dialectic. 
“Reports of actual falls cited against Galileo by Aristotelian natural philosophers are docu- 
mented in W. R. Shea, Galileo’s Intellectual Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 11, note 10. 
For a present-day review of the evidence that the speed of fall of a body in natural circumstances 
depends on its weight, see G. Feinberg, ‘Fall of Bodies Near the Earth’, American Journal ofPhysics 
33 (1965), 501-502, and C. G. Adler and B. L. Coulter, ‘Aristotle: Villain or Victim?‘, Physics 
Teacher 13 (1975), 35-37. 
“‘The moving ship thought experiments are in G. Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief 
World Systems-Ptolemaic and Copernican (1632), translated by S. Drake (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1953), pp. 143-145; the reaction to them by Aristotelian natural philosophers is 
described in Shea, op. cit., note 19, p. 156, and E. Grant, ‘In Defense of the Earth’s Centrality and 
Immobility: Scholastic Reaction to Copernicanism in the Seventeenth Century’, Transactions of the 
American Philosophical Society 74 (1984). part 4, p. 41. 
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natural occurrences are what the Aristotelian form of mechanics takes as evidence. 
The grounds on which the proponents of the Aristotelian form of mechanics 
rejected Galileo’s reliance on thought experiment suggest that none of Brown’s 
and Sorensen’s three conclusions about thought experiment is tenable. Firstly, 
it is unjustifiable to conclude that certain thought experiments can be identified 
as possessing an intrinsic high efficacy in establishing or discrediting scientific 
claims: thought experiment has evidential significance in a science only in virtue 
of being attributed it on particular premises. In consequence, both Brown’s 
view that thought experiments yield a priori knowledge of the world, and 
Sorensen’s view that they refute scientific claims by disproving modal 
consequences of them, require qualification: thought experiments may be taken 
to have these powers, but only where premises are accepted that assign 
evidential significance to them. Secondly, it is by this stage clear that the denial 
of evidential significance to thought experiment by Aristotelian natural phi- 
losophers is not due to their being insufficiently well informed or fair minded: 
on the contrary, they differed with Galileo on principled grounds about what 
counts as evidence in mechanics. Thirdly, if thought experiment lacks evidential 
significance in Aristotelian mechanics but possesses it in Galilean mechanics, 
then there must be stages in which thought experiment acquires (and 
perhaps also stages in which it can lose) evidential significance. The logicists’ 
supposition that such stages do not exist forecloses investigation of them, 
impoverishing our understanding of thought experiment. In the next section, I 
try to redress the balance by offering a sketch of how, in consequence of the 
efforts of Galileo, thought experiment acquired evidential significance in 
mechanics and other sciences. 
Some may think that the thesis that thought experiment has intrinsic 
evidential significance is corroborated by the attitude of Galileo himself. In his 
writings, Galileo takes it for granted that the evidential significance of thought 
experiment is intrinsic to it: he presents his thought experiment about free fall 
as self-evidently establishing that the rate of fall of bodies is independent of 
their weight, implying that any reader of his who rejects this conclusion must 
have failed to understand him. But the fact that a particular claim is portrayed 
as indubitable by some participants in a scientific controversy cannot be taken 
as evidence that the claim is indeed beyond doubt. Both the victors and the 
losers of controversies generally present their claims as indubitable: the task of 
those later studying the episode is to explain how the claims of the former came 
eventually to be seen as indubitable and those of the latter as false. 
5. Thought Experiment in the Galilean Doctrine of Phenomena 
According to Galileo’s account of concrete experiment, as we have seen, 
a phenomenon may be displayed in accident-free form in the contrived 
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occurrence of which an experiment consists. If an experiment is successful in 
stripping a phenomenon of accidents, then a description of the outcome of that 
experiment amounts to a description of the phenomenon. For example, if a 
concrete experiment could be devised that presented the phenomenon of free 
fall in accident-free form, then a description of the occurrence of which 
that experiment consisted would amount to a description of the phenomenon 
‘free fall’. 
This account of concrete experiment entails that, if an experiment is 
successful in presenting a phenomenon in accident-free form, all performances 
of that experiment will have the same outcome: if distinct performances of an 
experiment have different outcomes, they must have been determined partly by 
accidents, and the experiment must thus have failed to present the phenomenon 
in accident-free form. I conjecture that Galileo perceived that, for him to be 
able plausibly to present an experiment as displaying a phenomenon, distinct 
performances of the experiment-at least, those that could be regarded as 
having been carried out competently-had to show substantial accord with one 
another. 
Galileo doubtless considered that, in the case of some concrete experiments 
that he could envisage, distinct performances indeed showed substantial accord: 
each of these experiments could plausibly be presented as displaying a 
phenomenon. In the case of some other experiments, however, distinct 
performances conflicted: none of these experiments could be presented as 
yielding the description of a phenomenon. In areas of mechanics where every 
feasible concrete experiment was of the latter sort, as long as Galileo vested 
evidential significance exclusively in concrete experiment, he had no means of 
establishing and discrediting claims about phenomena. 
I suggest that Galileo devised thought experiment as a source of evidence 
about phenomena for use where all feasible concrete experiments exhibited the 
shortcoming that distinct performances of them conflicted. Galileo’s thinking 
may have proceeded as follows. Experimentation is the attempt to produce an 
occurrence determined entirely by a phenomenon and to no extent by accidents. 
If a phenomenon is so subtle that no actual occurrence can be produced in 
which the phenomenon is displayed in accident-free form, the only occurrence 
in which the phenomenon may be displayed is one that is non-actual. This is 
what a thought experiment does: it produces a non-actual occurrence in which 
a phenomenon is displayed. 
My suggestion that Galileo followed this line of reasoning explains why he 
resorted to thought experiment in the study of free fall. Distinct performances 
of any concrete experiment about free fall that was feasible in Galileo’s time 
would certainly have conflicted with one another: for example, performances 
involving falling bodies of different weights, densities, and shapes would not 
have accorded on any clear-cut phenomenon of free fall. In Galileo’s terms, 
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such concrete experiments fail to display the phenomenon ‘free fall’ in 
accident-free form. Thus, to display this phenomenon, Galileo was compelled 
to turn to a non-actual occurrence-the one that his thought experiment 
presents. This non-actual occurrence allowed Galileo to establish the claim 
that, in the phenomenon ‘free fall’, the speed of falling bodies is independent of 
their weight. 
All the other notable appeals that Galileo made to thought experiment are 
similarly in areas of mechanics in which distinct performances of any feasible 
concrete experiment would have conflicted with one another, and therefore in 
which it was not possible to establish and discredit claims about phenomena by 
means of concrete experiment. For example, the period of a simple pendulum 
is dependent to some extent on the amplitude of swing; and this dependence 
is different in different pendulums. Because of this, no feasible concrete 
experiment would have supported Galileo’s claim that the period of a simple 
pendulum is independent of the amplitude of swing. Similarly, to establish that 
we should not expect the earth’s motion to have a detectable effect on the 
motion of objects around us, Galileo may originally have considered arranging 
a concrete experiment in which an object was dropped from the mast of a 
moving ship: but distinct performances of such an experiment on a rolling 
and pitching deck would plainly have conflicted with one another. In each of 
these cases, Galileo appealed instead to thought experiments, in which 
the phenomena whose properties he sought to establish were displayed in 
accident-free foimzl 
The value of thought experiment as a means to display phenomena in 
accident-free form was apparent also to Christiaan Huygens, who followed 
Galileo in regarding mechanics as a science of phenomena. Huygens used 
thought experiment to establish his laws of impact, including the claim that in 
an elastic collision between two bodies of equal mass the velocities of the bodies 
are exchanged. In the thought experiments that Huygens put forward to 
establish this claim, a collision takes place on a moving boat between two 
bodies, whose velocities before and after the collision are measured by 
observers on the boat and ashore .2* The practicalities of boats in motion ensure 
that, if this were performed as a concrete experiment, distinct performances of 
it would conflict with one another, failing to establish any simple relation 
between the bodies’ velocities. Huygens may have reasoned that, while concrete 
experiment failed to display the phenomenon ‘elastic collision’ in accident-free 
form, thought experiment would succeed. 
*‘The pendulum thought experiment is in Galilei, Two New Sciences, op. cit., note 9, 
pp. 91-99. 
‘*C Huygens De motu corporum ex percussione (1703), in Oeuvres compktes de Christiaan 
Hu&ns, 22 vok (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 188&1950), vol. 16 (1929), pp. 29-91, on 
pp. 2949. 
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On the Galilean doctrine of phenomena, to attribute evidential significance to 
thought experiment in mechanics has considerable plausibility. If you believe 
that mechanics is a science of phenomena, and that a phenomenon is displayed 
in an accident-free occurrence, then you will regard evidential significance in 
mechanics to be vested in accident-free occurrences. If in the case of some 
phenomena no actual accident-free occurrences can be produced, but you 
believe that you can produce some non-actual accident-free occurrences, then 
you will be content to let controversies in mechanics be resolved by appeal to 
such occurrences. 
These remarks suggest that thought experiment is attributed evidential 
significance by the Galilean doctrine of phenomena, and will carry evidential 
weight in areas of science where this doctrine is accepted. The Galilean doctrine 
of phenomena is endorsed in, for example, Newtonian mechanics and 
Darwinian evolutionary biology: and thought experiment carries evidential 
significance in both these forms of science. Newtonian mechanics regards 
natural occurrences as determined jointly by universal regularities, which 
resemble Galileo’s phenomena, and by initial or boundary conditions, which 
are considered as non-lawlike and as lying outside the scope of physical 
theorizing, like Galileo’s accidents. 23 This analysis leads Newtonian mechanics 
to envisage that, while a regularity may not be apparent in actual occurrences, 
it may be displayed in an imaginary occurrence that abstracts from the 
peculiarities of initial conditions. Consequently, Newtonian mechanics 
attributes evidential significance to thought experiment as a means to display 
phenomena. An example is the phenomenon ‘absolute rotation’. Concrete 
experiment is not suited to display this phenomenon, since the objects 
surrounding any actual rotating body make it impossible to distinguish 
absolute motion from relative motion. But Newtonian mechanics allows that 
absolute rotation may be displayed by thought experiment: indeed, Isaac 
Newton believed that this phenomenon was displayed by a thought experiment 
that he presented, which envisaged a rotating bucket in an otherwise empty 
universe.24 Darwinian evolutionary biology subscribes to the Galilean doctrine 
of phenomena to the extent of envisaging that phenomena exist-natural and 
sexual selection, in the classical formulation-that, because of the interference 
of accidents, cannot be discerned in actual occurrences. In virtue of this 
conception of the science, thought experiment bears evidential significance in 
Darwinian evolutionary biology as a means to display phenomena.25 
23For the Newtonian account of the relation between occurrences, regularities, and initial 
conditions, see for example E. P. Wigner, ‘Events, Laws of Nature, and Invariance Principles’ 
(1964), in E. P. Wigner, Symmetries and Rejlections: Scientific Essays (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1967), pp. 38-50, on pp. 3842. 
2“R. Laymon, ‘Newton’s Bucket Experiment’, Journal of the Htitory of Philosophy 16 (1978), 
399413. 
*sJ G Lennox ‘Darwinian Thought Experiments: A Function for Just-So Stories’, in Horowitz 
and Massey, op. kit., note 1, pp. 223-245. 
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In contrast, in areas of science where the Galilean doctrine of phenomena is 
rejected and no alternative rationale for thought experiment is provided, the 
attribution of evidential significance to thought experiment will be implausible. 
In particular, if you believe that science aims to describe natural occurrences 
rather than something resembling Galilean phenomena, you will attribute no 
evidential significance to thought experiment. As we have seen, this attitude was 
maintained by the proponents of the Aristotelian form of mechanics; and it is 
widely maintained today in sciences other than physics. For example, many 
areas of the present-day life and earth sciences conceive of their aim as 
compiling a detailed record of natural occurrences in the style of natural 
history, rather than an inventory of Galilean phenomena assumed to lie behind 
occurrences. Correspondingly, these sciences are not moved to attribute 
evidential significance to thought experiment. 
Brown and Sorensen note that thought experiment appears to have special 
efficacy in establishing laws of nature. 26 My suggestion that thought experiment 
derives evidential significance in mechanics and other sciences from the 
Galilean doctrine of phenomena explains this fact, though on grounds 
which Brown and Sorensen would not accept. Only sciences that endorse the 
Galilean doctrine of phenomena formulate claims presented as laws of nature; 
and they interpret a law of nature as the description of a fundamental mode 
in which physical reality manifests itself-a phenomenon, in Galileo’s term, or 
a universal regularity, in Newton’s. The Galilean doctrine of phenomena 
portrays thought experiment as a technique for displaying phenomena or 
universal regularities in pure form. From these premises it follows straight- 
forwardly that thought experiment is well suited to establish what we call laws 
of nature. 
6. The Imperviousness of Quantum State Transitions to Thought Experiment 
I have argued that thought experiment has evidential significance only 
historically and locally, i.e. when and where premises that attribute evidential 
significance to it, such as the Galilean doctrine of phenomena, are endorsed. In 
a further defence of this claim, I argue in this final section that there is an area 
of modern physics in which current theory is incompatible with the Galilean 
doctrine of phenomena, and in which consequently-no additional or alterna- 
tive justification of thought experiment having as yet been evolved-thought 
experiment lacks evidential significance. This area is the study of the discon- 
tinuous transitions between quantum states that some subatomic and atomic 
systems undergo. Examples of these transitions are the decay events of unstable 
elementary particles such as free neutrons, the decay events of radioactive 
nuclei, and electron jumps from excited to stable energy levels in atoms. 
26Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, op. cit., note 2, pp. 7&98; Sorensen, ‘Thought 
Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws’, op. cit., note 2. 
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What distinguishes discontinuous quantum state transitions from the 
occurrences treated by classical mechanics is that, while classical mechanics 
regards the latter as deterministic, quantum mechanics regards the former as 
indeterministic. The statement that classical occurrences are deterministic 
entails that, if two classical occurrences differ from one another, there must 
have been some difference in the causal factors by which they were determined. 
This means that, while any similarity between two classical occurrences can be 
attributed to causal factors common to them, we will invariably be able to 
identify differentially acting causal factors to which to attribute any differences 
between them. This amounts to a guarantee that any classical occurrence can be 
described as determined jointly by two factors: one or more phenomena, by 
which similar occurrences will also be determined, and accidents, which will 
be peculiar to the occurrence in question. Thus, the Galilean doctrine of 
phenomena holds for such occurrences, and scope is opened for thought 
experiment to have evidential significance as a means to display phenomena in 
accident-free form. 
In contrast, the statement that discontinuous quantum state transitions are 
not deterministic entails that two such occurrences may differ from one another 
without there being any difference in the causal factors by which they were 
determined. This means that for such an occurrence it is not possible to identify 
a phenomenon that can be said to have contributed to determine this and all 
similar occurrences, and accidents that can be said to be peculiar to this 
occurrence. For example, given a particular radioactive decay event, it is not 
possible to identify a regularity common to all decay events of its kind and a set 
of circumstances peculiar to this event (such as may explain why it took place 
at one time rather than another) by which this event could be said to have been 
jointly determined. The same holds for the spontaneous decay of an elementary 
particle and for an electron jump from an excited to a stable energy state. 
Because of this feature of discontinuous quantum state transitions, a 
procedure purporting to display the phenomena that underlie occurrences 
will be regarded as not applicable to them. As long as the attribution of 
evidential significance to thought experiment depends on portraying it as such 
a procedure, we should expect that thought experiment will be regarded as 
incapable of yielding information about such occurrences-i.e. as having no 
evidential significance in the study of such occurrences. 
I believe that this expectation is borne out in present-day quantum 
mechanics. There is no shortage of thought experiments serving various 
purposes in quantum mechanics, and among these are many thought 
experiments that model the effects of discontinuous quantum state transitions 
in given scenarios. An example of the latter is the Schrodinger’s cat thought 
experiment, in which a radioactive decay event is envisaged to cause a particular 
sequence of events. But in all such thought experiments the quantum state 
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transition features merely as a black box, as the source of a particular output. 
There appears to be no thought experiment that is taken to shed light on the 
nature of discontinuous quantum state transitions themselves, in the way in 
which Galileo’s thought experiment is taken in classical mechanics to shed light 
on the nature of free fall. In view of the fact that so many other aspects of 
quantum theory have been analyzed in thought experiment, I do not believe 
that this lack is fortuitous. On the contrary, present-day quantum physicists 
find the very notion of a thought experiment able to elucidate the nature of 
discontinuous quantum state transitions elusory, as if these occurrences were 
impervious to thought experiment. I regard the elusory feel of the notion of a 
thought experiment about discontinuous quantum state transitions as further 
evidence that thought experiment has evidential significance only historically 
and locally. 
Given our inability to predict the future development of science, we cannot 
rule out that the state of affairs in quantum mechanics will change. It may be 
that causal factors resembling Galilean phenomena will be discovered for 
discontinuous quantum state transitions; or it may be that in physics a new 
doctrine will become established that regards thought experiment other than as 
a technique for displaying a phenomenon in accident-free form. In these 
eventualities, thought experiment may come to have evidential significance 
in the study of discontinuous quantum state transitions. It should go without 
saying that, in either eventuality, the evidential significance of thought 
experiment will remain the outcome of historical and local accomplishments. 
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